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RESEARCH ARCHIVE · FOULS PER GAME

Referee research archive

Compare foul patterns in the games each official worked. Three officials share every game, and these records do not identify who made a call or whether it was correct.

Foul patterns vary across officials' games. Across 12,403 regular-season games since 2015-16, the analysis compares foul mix, timing, and home-away differences. Because the data records crews rather than individual calls, it cannot establish an official's bias.

WHAT SEPARATES OFFICIALS · THE MIX

Each cell compares a foul type's share in an official’s games with the league average for those seasons. Every row uses the official's most recent 200 games. Bold cells exceed two standard errors; muted cells do not. Some cells will cross that threshold by chance when many are compared.

74 OF 74 OFFICIALS
#
1Josh TivenCC936302015-16−4%0%−1%0%−4%−3%
2Brent BarnakyCC886172015-16−1%+2%+3%−17%−3%−9%
3Brian ForteCC786102015-16−3%0%+1%−14%+2%+17%
4Zach ZarbaCC1106082015-16−4%+1%+1%+13%−22%−26%
5Gediminas PetraitisCC126002015-16+2%−1%−1%0%+4%+7%
6James WilliamsCC1125962015-16−5%+1%−4%+10%−5%+28%
7Marc DavisCC575922015-16−5%+1%−2%−17%+5%+4%
8Nick BuchertCC195912015-16+2%−2%+3%+4%−8%+14%
9Karl LaneCC285882015-16−1%+2%0%−4%0%−18%
10Tyler FordCC235862015-16+2%+2%−4%+6%+10%−9%
11Sean WrightCC935852015-16+2%0%+2%+7%−18%+4%
12Pat FraherCC1055832015-16+2%+5%−5%−13%+4%−9%
13Tony BrothersCC655812015-160%+3%−1%−11%−1%+3%
14Courtney KirklandCC1065772015-160%+1%−3%+2%+8%−13%
15Curtis BlairCC775702015-160%−3%+7%−4%−1%−1%
16Justin Van DuyneCC65672015-16−3%−1%+1%−1%+7%−7%
17Kevin CutlerCC605672015-16−2%+3%−1%−7%−4%−23%
18Kevin ScottCC355602015-16−2%+1%+1%0%−13%+3%
19Marat KogutCC685592015-16+3%0%+1%−8%−1%+12%
20Scott FosterCC675572015-16+2%0%−3%+6%+16%−23%
21Mark LindsayCC885532015-16+1%+1%0%+5%−10%−22%
22Ed MalloyCC885482015-16−1%+1%−1%−12%+1%+8%
23Mitchell ErvinCC305482015-16+2%−1%−1%+11%0%−2%
24Ben TaylorCC185442015-16+3%−3%0%+15%+10%+8%
25Dedric TaylorCC255412015-160%+2%−1%−2%−4%+9%
26John GobleCC965402015-160%−4%+5%+6%0%+9%
27Scott TwardoskiCC105402015-160%−1%0%−1%+13%−26%
28Derrick CollinsCC755182015-16−2%0%+1%−3%+1%−8%
29James CapersCC805182015-160%−3%+1%+19%−4%−3%
30Michael SmithCC125172015-16+4%−5%+5%+4%+14%−2%
31Eric DalenCC485052015-16−1%0%−1%+5%+5%−10%
32Tre MaddoxCC265012015-16+1%+1%−3%+5%+3%+2%
33Rodney MottCC305002015-16+2%−3%0%+16%+8%−5%
34Jacyn GobleCC544982016-170%+1%−4%+1%+2%+22%
35Sean CorbinCC384942015-16−2%+1%+1%−11%−4%+2%
36J.T. OrrCC224912015-16+1%−2%−2%+15%−1%+12%
37Bill KennedyCC644772015-16+1%+2%+1%−7%−10%+7%
38Ray AcostaCC24772017-18−3%+1%−2%−1%−1%−6%
39David GuthrieCC224742015-16−1%−1%+5%−12%−10%+24%
40Aaron SmithCC24492015-16−2%+1%−1%+16%−13%−2%
41Tom WashingtonCC124472015-16−4%+2%+2%−9%−4%−23%
42Matt BolandCC364462015-16−1%−3%+5%+7%−13%+6%
43Eric LewisCC84412015-16+5%−2%+4%+10%−6%−2%
44Leon WoodCC64192015-160%−3%+3%+5%+6%−21%
45CJ WashingtonCC74082015-16+2%+1%+1%0%−3%−4%
46Brett NanselCC34002015-16−1%+2%−1%−6%−6%−6%
47Derek RichardsonCC383982015-160%−1%+1%−12%−3%−3%
48Natalie Sago—3972018-19−3%+3%−4%+4%−1%−6%
49Jason GoldenbergCC493902015-16+1%+1%−4%+4%−4%+14%
50Scott Wall—3902015-160%−1%+2%+2%0%−6%
51Jonathan Sterling—3722017-18+2%−2%0%+11%+7%0%
52Phenizee RansomCC203542016-17+3%−1%+4%−5%−4%+11%
53J.B. DeRosaCC33462017-18+2%+2%−4%−2%+3%+19%
54Kane Fitzgerald—3462015-16+3%−1%−2%+11%+10%+17%
55Brandon Adair—3452017-18−4%+2%0%−2%−10%−21%
56Mousa Dagher—3342018-19+3%−2%0%+7%+12%−16%
57John Butler—3302018-19−1%+3%−2%−11%0%−3%
58Andy NagyCC23072019-20+1%+2%−3%+8%−10%+3%
59Matt MyersCC73072017-18+2%+1%0%−12%+7%−6%
60Tony Brown—2982015-16+3%−2%+3%+4%+9%−13%
61Mark Ayotte—2972015-16+1%−2%+7%−7%−13%−7%
62Ken Mauer—2962015-16−1%+1%−2%+1%−6%−4%
63Evan Scott—2842018-190%−2%+1%+4%+5%+22%
64Lauren Holtkamp—2702015-16−1%+1%+1%−10%−2%+6%
65Ashley Moyer-Gleich—2622018-19−1%+2%−3%−4%+2%−12%
66Jenna SchroederCC12612019-20−1%+2%−1%−12%−2%+9%
67Leroy Richardson—2582015-160%+1%+1%−12%+5%−8%
68Suyash Mehta—2472019-20+1%+2%−1%−6%−3%+4%
69Nate GreenCC12422020-210%−1%+2%+2%−2%+11%
70Haywoode Workman—2262015-160%+1%+1%0%−3%−4%
71Brandon Schwab—2242020-21−2%+5%−4%−7%−4%−7%
72Bennie Adams—2182015-16+2%−4%+2%+8%+3%+6%
73Mike Callahan—2102015-16−3%+1%+2%−12%−6%−10%
74Ron Garretson—2082015-16−4%−1%+3%−2%−8%−7%

EVERY MEASURED CELL = THE OFFICIAL’S LAST 200 GAMES, THE SAME SAMPLE FOR EVERY ROW · BOLD = BEYOND TWO STANDARD ERRORS · MUTED = INSIDE NOISE · CC = WORKS AS CREW CHIEF · 54 OF 74 DO · SINCE = FIRST SEASON IN THIS DATA (2015-16 AT THE EARLIEST), NOT A HIRE DATE

WHEN THE FOULS COME · A REAL, NARROW EFFECT

In this sample, the league calls 20.3% of them in the first quarter and 28.1% in the fourth. Officials differ in how far they lean that way, and they differ at the ends of a game rather than through it: the first and fourth quarters separate them, the second and third do not.

1ST QUARTER10 vs 3.42.94× CHANCE · MODEST
2ND QUARTER2 vs 3.40.59× CHANCE · AT CHANCE
3RD QUARTER5 vs 3.41.47× CHANCE · AT CHANCE
4TH QUARTER8 vs 3.42.35× CHANCE · MODEST

The four quarter shares sum to a whole game, so they are dependent: a lower share in one quarter requires a higher share elsewhere. The measure below summarises the shift toward later fouls in each official's games.

  • Zach Zarba+2.39 pp · 635 games
  • Mark Ayotte−1.53 pp · 323 games
  • Ed Malloy−1.46 pp · 564 games
  • Tyler Ford−1.45 pp · 611 games
  • Tom Washington−1.40 pp · 473 games

Positive means later. Percentage points of a game’s own fouls, against the league average for that season, over officials with at least 200 games. These game counts run slightly higher than the table above: timing is read from the play stream alone, which survives in games whose box score does not, so it covers 451 more of them.

LATE-GAME AND HOME-AWAY COMPARISONS

Late-game variation does not exceed the chance expectation. Across 12,403 games, the league calls 0.92 fouls in the last 2 minutes of a fourth quarter, 8.5% of that quarter’s fouls. The number of officials crossing the comparison threshold is 2 against 3.4 expected by chance. This test compares officials; it cannot determine whether officials collectively pass up calls or whether any individual call was correct.

Home-away foul counts differ modestly. Home teams are called for 0.19 fewer shooting fouls a game than visitors, and officials do differ in how far they lean that way: splitting each one’s home-minus-away gap by foul type puts 7 of them past the bar on shooting fouls and 7 on personals, against the 3.4 that noise alone produces among 74 officials. These counts exceed the chance expectation, but the home-away spread is about one foul per game across officials. Crew assignment and team behaviour limit what can be attributed to an individual.

THE FEATURED PLAYOFF RECORD
1–10CHRIS PAUL’S PLAYOFF RECORD IN GAMES SCOTT FOSTER WORKED · 6.34 WINS EXPECTED

Observed wins and model expectation. Across the 913 playoff games played since 2015-16, Chris Paul’s teams won 1 of the 11 that Scott Foster worked. Expected wins come from a model fitted to playoff team-games using both teams’ regular-season strength and home court. This adjusts for those factors but does not fully account for how officials are assigned.

Opponents faced with Foster had a slightly lower mean regular-season win rate than those faced without him: 0.599 against 0.606 by win rate. Of the 689 official-and-player pairs with at least 10 shared playoff games, this one ranks #1 in this dataset.

OTHER PLAYERS WITH THE SAME OFFICIAL

four other players finished above their expected wins. Same official, same seasons, same method that produced the figure above.

PlayerWith Fosterwon–playedExpectedwinsDifferencewins
OG Anunoby11–126.36+4.64
Miles McBride10–115.30+4.70
Josh Hart10–115.30+4.70
Mitchell Robinson9–104.69+4.31
Eric Gordon1–104.97−3.97

OG Anunoby, Miles McBride, Josh Hart and Mitchell Robinson all cleared their expectation by four wins or more in games worked by the same official while Eric Gordon won 1 of 10. Comparing many pairs produces both positive and negative extremes.

ANOTHER LARGE GAP
2 of 16MARCUS SMART WITH TONY BROTHERS · 8.06 WINS EXPECTED
MISSED BY−6.06WINS · WIDER THAN THE FAMOUS ONE

Marcus Smart and Tony Brothers have a larger shortfall in wins than the featured pair. A larger raw shortfall does not necessarily mean a smaller p-value, because sample size and expected wins also differ.

EXTREMES EXPECTED FROM MANY COMPARISONS
PAIRS EXAMINED689AT LEAST 10 SHARED PLAYOFF GAMES
CLEARED p < 0.017 vs 6.9OBSERVED VS EXPECTED BY CHANCE
CLEARED p < 0.0527 vs 34.5FEWER THAN CHANCE PRODUCES

Chance also produces extreme records. Across 689 pairs, the chance calculation's expected minimum p-value is 0.00145. Scott Foster and Chris Paul come in at p = 0.0016, less extreme than that reference. The expected minimum is a comparison scale, not a corrected significance threshold or a guarantee about what chance will produce.

In the full grid, 7 pairs clear p < 0.01 where chance predicts 6.9, and 27 clear p < 0.05 where chance predicts 34.5. These counts do not exceed their chance expectations. They provide no aggregate evidence of excess extreme pairs under this comparison.

GAMES AFTER THE CLAIM BECAME KNOWN

A claim found by looking can only be confirmed on games nobody had seen when they found it. This one was in circulation by the end of 2019-20. Before then,Chris Paul was 0–6 with Scott Foster, and after it was famous, 1–4.

Both periods are too small for the declared test. Both halves fall under the 10 shared games this page requires before it will evaluate a pair. That threshold was written down before the analysis. The available later games therefore cannot provide the planned confirmation test.

WHILE WE ARE HERE · MAKE-UP CALLS

Consecutive calls switch teams more often than after shuffling. Across 498,007 consecutive foul pairs, the next whistle goes against the other team 52.4% of the time, against 50.5% when you shuffle the same game’s calls into a random order, with t = 27.4.

Shuffling also removes possession order. After an offensive foul, the fouling team turns the ball over and defends. If possession drives the pattern, the next foul may be on that same team; a simple make-up-call explanation predicts a switch.

AFTER A DEFENSIVE FOUL53.0%NEXT CALL SWITCHES TEAMS
AFTER AN OFFENSIVE FOUL48.5%BELOW CHANCE, NOT ABOVE
…WITHIN 15 SECONDS22.0%THE SAME TEAM, FOUR TIMES IN FIVE

The reversal after offensive fouls is consistent with possession changes. It weakens the simple make-up-call explanation but cannot rule out individual make-up calls.

STAR FOUL TROUBLE

Two first-quarter fouls are associated with fewer minutes. They occur in 6.2% of 21,400 star-games, with 1.17 fewer minutes than the player's own average. Across 73 officials the spread is 1.01× what random assignment produces, at p = 0.4535. The rates are 6.2% on the road against 6.1% at home, a gap of 0.09 percentage points.

HOW TO READ ANY OF THIS

Three officials work every game and the play-by-play never records which one made a call, so every figure on this page credits all three and cannot isolate an individual effect. None of it separates a correct call from an incorrect one. The questions, the thresholds and the five named claims were all fixed in writing before the playoff data was fetched (ml/referee_player_preregistration.md). Results are published even when they do not meet their declared evidence thresholds.

WHAT THESE NUMBERS CANNOT DO

Every game credits all three officials because the play-by-play does not identify who made each call. Changing crewmates may reduce the influence of any one partner, but the analysis cannot isolate an individual official's contribution.

None of this is a fairness claim. Calling more offensive fouls says nothing about whom an official favors, and no measurement on this page distinguishes a correct call from an incorrect one. It measures how often each kind of call is recorded.